by Ryan Wardle
Mises.org
On some level, all of us realize that traffic tickets are seen by local governments as a form of revenue. Supposedly, the intent behind issuance of fines for traffic offenses is to disincentivize behaviors which are deemed to be unsafe, such as driving over the speed limit or not wearing a seatbelt (despite the fact that the latter poses no risk to anyone but the driver). The punishment for this type of offense being almost always a fine, as opposed to any type of nonmonetary punishment, is suspect in itself. But even if the monetary cost of speeding tickets really is better at preventing speeding than some other punishment, the fact remains that local governments do lay claim to the money forfeited and for that reason have another incentive besides community safety to issue those tickets.
It is common wisdom that one runs an especial risk of being ticketed if caught speeding in or around a small town because those towns don’t have as much money as bigger cities, and they’d quite like to have some of yours. Intuitively, this makes sense. If a small town can accrue revenue from people passing through, they have less reason to burden their voting constituency with additional taxes, which makes the local officials’ outlooks in future elections a bit more favorable.